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Abstract. The random priority (random serial dictatorship) mechanism is a common
method for assigning objects to individuals. The mechanism is easy to implement and
strategy-proof. However this mechanism is inefficient, as the agents may be made all
better off by another mechanism that increases their chances of obtaining more preferred
objects. Such an inefficiency is eliminated by the recent mechanism called probabilistic
serial, but this mechanism is not strategy-proof. Thus, which mechanism to employ in
practical applications has been an open question. This paper shows that these mecha-
nisms become equivalent when the market becomes large. More specifically, given a set
of object types, the random assignments in these mechanisms converge to each other as
the number of copies of each object type approaches infinity. Thus, the inefficiency of
the random priority mechanism becomes small in large markets. Our result gives some
rationale for the common use of the random priority mechanism in practical problems
such as student placement in public schools. JEL Classification Numbers: C70, D61,
D63.
Keywords: random assignment, random priority, probabilistic serial, ordinal efficiency,
asymptotic equivalence.
Date: October 1, 2008.
We are grateful to Susan Athey, Eric Budish, Eduardo Faingold, Dino Gerardi, Johannes Ho¨rner,
Mihai Manea, Herve´ Moulin, Muriel Niederle, Michael Ostrovsky, Parag Pathak, Ben Polak, Al Roth,
Kareen Rozen, Larry Samuelson, Michael Schwarz, Tayfun So¨nmez, Yuki Takagi, Rakesh Vohra and
seminar participants at Harvard Business School, Toronto, Yale, Korean Econometric Society Meeting
and SITE Workshop on Market Design for helpful discussions. Yeon-Koo Che is grateful to the NSF
Grant (SES#0721053) for financial support.
1
2 YEON-KOO CHE AND FUHITO KOJIMA
1. Introduction
Consider a mechanism designer’s problem to assign indivisible objects to agents who
can consume at most one object each. University housing allocation, public housing al-
location, office assignment, parking space assignment, and student placement in public
schools are examples in real life.1 A typical goal of the mechanism designer is to assign
the objects efficiently and fairly, while eliciting the true preferences of the agents. The
mechanism often need to satisfy other constraints as well. For example, monetary trans-
fers may be impossible or undesirable to use, as in the case of low income housing or
placement to public schools. In such a case, random assignments are employed to achieve
fairness. Further, the assignment often depends on agents’ reports of ordinal preferences
over objects rather than full cardinal preferences, since elicitation of cardinal preferences
may be difficult.2 Two mechanisms have been regarded as promising solutions: the ran-
dom priority mechanism (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez 1998) and the probabilistic serial
mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001).
In random priority, agents are ordered with equal probability and, for each realization
of the ordering, the first agent in the ordering receives her most preferred object, the next
agent receives his most preferred object among the remaining ones, and so on. Random
priority is strategy-proof, that is, reporting ordinal preferences truthfully is a weakly
dominant strategy for every agent. Moreover, random priority is ex-post efficient; the
assignment after the ordering lottery is resolved is Pareto efficient. The random priority
mechanism can also be easily tailored to accommodate other features, such as students
applying as roommates in college housing,3 or respecting priorities of existing tenants in
house allocation (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez 1999) and non-strict priorities by schools
1See Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1999) and Chen and So¨nmez (2002) for application to house allo-
cation, and Balinski and So¨nmez (1999) and Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003b) for student placement.
For the latter application, Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and Roth (2005) and Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, Roth,
and So¨nmez (2005) discuss practical considerations in designing student placement mechanisms in New
York City and Boston.
2The pseudo-market mechanism proposed by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) is one of the few mecha-
nisms proposed in the literature in which agents report their cardinal preferences over objects.
3Applications by would-be roommates can be easily incorporated into the random priority mechanism
by requiring each such group to receive the same random priority order. For instance, non-freshman
undergraduate students at Columbia University can apply as a group, in which case they draw the same
lottery number. The lottery number, along with their seniority points, determines their priority. If no
suite is available to accommodate the group or they do not like the available suite options, they can split
up and make choices as individuals. This sort of flexibility between group and individual assignments
seems difficult to achieve in other mechanisms such as the probabilistic serial mechanism.
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in student placement (Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and Roth 2005, Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak,
Roth, and So¨nmez 2005).
Perhaps more importantly for practical purpose, the random priority mechanism is
straightforward and transparent, with the lottery used for assignment specified explic-
itly. Transparency of a mechanism can be crucial for ensuring fairness in the eyes of
participants, who may otherwise be concerned about possible “covert selection.”4 These
advantages underscore the wide use of the random priority mechanism in many settings,
such as house allocation in universities, student placement in public schools, and parking
space assignment.
Despite many advantages of the random priority mechanism, it may entail unambiguous
efficiency loss ex ante. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) provide an example in which the
random priority assignment is dominated by another random assignment that improves
the chance of obtaining a more preferred object for each agent, in the sense of first-order
stochastic dominance. Bogomolnaia and Moulin introduce the ordinal efficiency concept:
a random assignment is ordinally efficient if it is not first-order stochastically dominated
for all agents by any other random assignment. Ordinal efficiency is perhaps the most
relevant efficiency concept in the context of assignment mechanisms based solely on ordinal
preferences.
Bogomolnaia and Moulin propose the probabilistic serial mechanism as an alternative to
the random priority mechanism. The basic idea is to regard each object as a continuum of
“probability shares.” Each agent “eats” her most preferred available object (in probability
share) with speed one at every point in time between 0 and 1. The probabilistic serial
random assignment is defined as the profile of shares of objects eaten by agents by time
1. The probabilistic serial random assignment is ordinally efficient if all the agents report
their ordinal preferences truthfully.
However, the probabilistic serial mechanism is not strategy-proof. In other words,
an agent may receive a more desirable random assignment (with respect to her true
expected utility function) by misreporting her ordinal preferences. The mechanism is
also less straightforward and less transparent for the participants than random priority,
since the lottery used for implementing random assignment can be complicated and is
4The concern of covert selection was pronounced in UK schools, which led to adoption of a new
Mandatory Admission Code in 2007. The code, among other things, “makes the admissions system
more straightforward, transparent and easier to understand for parents” (“Schools admissions code to
end covert selection,” Education Guardian, January 9, 2007). There had been numerous appeals by
parents on schools assignments in the UK; there were 78,670 appeals in 2005-2006, and 56,610 appeals
in 2006-2007.
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not explicitly specified. The tradeoffs between the two mechanisms — random priority
or probabilistic serial — are not easy to evaluate, leaving the choice between the two an
important outstanding question in practical applications.
The contribution of this paper is to offer a new perspective on the tradeoffs between the
random priority and probabilistic serial mechanisms. We do so by showing that the two
mechanisms become virtually equivalent in the large market. Specifically, we demonstrate
that, given a set of arbitrary object types, the random assignments in these mechanisms
converge to each other, as the number of copies of each object type approaches infinity.
Our result has several implications on both mechanisms. First, the result implies that
the inefficiency of the random priority mechanism becomes small and disappears in the
limit, as the economy becomes large. On the probabilistic serial mechanism, its equiv-
alence to the random priority mechanism in a large market means that its incentive
problem disappears in large economies — a fact formally shown by Kojima and Manea
(2008). Taken together, these implications mean that we do not have as strong a theo-
retical basis to distinguish the two mechanisms in the large markets as in small markets;
indeed, both will be good candidates in such a setting since they have good incentive,
efficiency and fairness properties.5 Given its practical merit, though, our result lends some
support for the common use of the random priority mechanism in practical applications
such as student placement in public schools.
In our model, the large market assumption means that there exist a large number of
copies of each object type. This model includes several interesting cases. For instance,
a special case is the replica economies model wherein the copies of object types and of
agent types are replicated a large number of times. Considering such a large economy is
useful for many practical applications. In student placement in public schools, there are
typically a large number of identical seats at each school. In the context of university
housing allocation, the set of rooms may be partitioned into a number of categories by
building and size, and all rooms of the same type may be treated to be identical.6 Our
model may be applicable to these markets.
5Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) present three desirable properties, namely ordinal efficiency, strategy-
proofness and equal treatment of equals, and show that no mechanism satisfies all these three desiderata
in finite economies. Random priority satisfies all but ordinal efficiency while probabilistic serial satisfies all
but strategy-proofness. Our equivalence result implies that both mechanisms satisfy all these desiderata
in the limit economy, thus overcoming impossibility in general finite economies.
6For example, the assignment of graduate housing at Harvard University is based on the preferences
of each student over eight types of rooms: two possible sizes (large and small) and four buildings.
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We investigate a number of further issues as well. First, we define the random priority
and probabilistic serial mechanisms directly in economies with continuum of agents and
objects. We show that random priority and probabilistic serial in finite economies converge
to those in the continuum economy. In that sense, we provide foundation of a modeling
approach that directly studies economies with continuum of objects and agents. Second,
we show that our equivalence is tight in the sense that in any finite economy, random
priority and probabilistic serial can be different. We also present several extensions such
as cases with existing priority and multi-unit demands.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
defines the random priority mechanism and the probabilistic serial mechanism. Section 4
presents the main result. Section 5 investigates further topics. Section 6 discusses related
literature. Section 7 provides conclusion. Proofs are found in the Appendix unless stated
otherwise.
2. Model
For each q ∈ N, consider a q-economy, Γq = (N q, (pii)i∈Nq , O), where N q represents
the set of agents and O represents the set of proper object types (we assume that O
is identical for all q). There are |O| = n object types, and each object type a ∈ O has
quota q, that is, q copies of a are available.7 There exist an infinite number of copies of
a null object ø, which is not included in O. Let O˜ := O ∪ {ø}. Each agent i ∈ N has a
strict preference represented by a permutation pii ∈ Π of O˜, where a given permutation
pii : {1, ..., n + 1} 7→ O˜ lists for its j-th element pii(j) the agent’s j-th most preferred
object. (That is, agent i prefers a over b if and only if pi−1i (a) < pi
−1
i (b).) For preference
type pi and for any O′ ⊂ O˜,
Chpi(O
′) := {a ∈ O′|pi−1(a) ≤ pi−1(b) ∀b ∈ O′},
is the object that an agent of preference type pi chooses if the set O′ of objects are available
to her.
The agents are partitioned into different preference types: N q = {N qpi}pi∈Π, where N qpi





per-unit number of agents of type pi in the q-economy. We assume, for each pi ∈ Π, there
exists m∞pi ∈ R+ such that mqpi → m∞pi as q → ∞. For q ∈ N ∪ {∞}, let mq := {mqpi}pi∈Π.
7Given a set X, we denote the cardinality of X by |X| or #X.
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be the per unit number of agents whose most preferred object in O′ is a in the q-economy.
Throughout, we do not impose any restriction on the way in which the q-economy, Γq,
grows with q (except for the existence of the limit m∞pi = limq→∞m
q
pi for each pi ∈ Π).
A special case of interest is when the economy grows at a constant rate with q. We
say that the family {Γq}q∈N are replica economies if mqpi = m∞pi (or equivalently, |N qpi| =
q|N1pi |) for all q ∈ N and all pi ∈ Π, and call Γ1 a base economy and Γq its q-fold replica.
Throughout, we focus on a symmetric random assignment in which all the agents with
the same preference type pi receive the same lottery over the objects. Formally, a sym-
metric random assignment in the q-economy is a mapping φq : Π 7→ ∆O˜, where
∆O˜ is the set of probability distributions over O˜, that satisfies the feasibility constraint∑
pi ∈Π φ
q
a(pi) · |N qpi| ≤ q, for each a ∈ O, where φqa(pi) represents the probability that a
type pi-agent receives the object a.8
It is useful to describe the limit economy (∞-economy) separately. For this purpose,
we assume that there exists a continuum of copies of objects in O and agents in N∞.
More precisely, there exists a unit mass of each object in O, and the set of agent types
Π is then endowed with a measure µ : Π 7→ R+ such that µ(pi) = m∞pi . A symmetric





a (pi) ·m∞pi ≤ 1 for each a ∈ O.
2.1. Ordinal Efficiency. Consider a q-economy (where q ∈ N ∪ {∞}). A symmetric
random assignment φq ordinally dominates another random assignment φˆq at mq if for
each preference type pi with mqpi > 0 the lottery φ








φˆqb(pi) ∀pi,mqpi > 0,∀a ∈ O˜,
with strict inequality for some (pi, a). The random assignment φq is ordinally efficient
at mq if it is not ordinally dominated at mq by any other random assignment. If φq
ordinally dominates φˆq at mq, then every agent of every preference type prefers their
assignment under φq to the one under φˆq according to any expected utility function with
utility index consistent with their ordinal preferences.
8The symmetry assumption that all the agents with the same preference type pi receive the same
lottery is often called the “equal treatment of equals” axiom.
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We say that φq is non-wasteful at mq if there exists no preference type pi ∈ Π with







Consider the binary relation B(φq,mq) on O˜ defined by
(2.2) aB (φq,mq) b ⇐⇒ ∃pi ∈ Π,mqpi > 0, pi−1(a) < pi−1(b) and φqb(pi) > 0.
In a setting in which each object has quota 1 and there exist an equal number of
agents and objects, Bogomolnaia and Moulin show the equivalence of ordinal efficiency
and acyclicity of this binary relation. Their characterization extends straightforwardly to
our setting as follows (the proof is omitted).
Proposition 1. The random assignment φq is ordinally efficient at mq if and only if the
relation B(φq,mq) is acyclic and φq is non-wasteful at mq.
3. Two Competing Mechanisms: Random Priority and Probabilistic Serial
3.1. Random Priority Mechanism. We introduce the random priority mechanism
(Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001), also called the random serial dictatorship (Abdulka-
dirog˘lu and So¨nmez 1998), which is widely used in practice. Given preferences of all the
agents, the agents are ordered randomly, and each agent selects, according to the order,
the most preferred object among the remaining ones. For our purpose, it is useful to
model the random ordering procedure as follows: First, each agent i randomly draws a
number fi independently from a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Second, the agent with the
smallest draw receives her most preferred object, the agent with the second-smallest draw
receives his most preferred object from the remaining ones, and so forth (it suffices to only
consider cases in which fi 6= fj for any i 6= j, since fi = fj occurs with probability zero).
This procedure induces a random assignment. We let RP q be the random assignment
under the random priority mechanism in Γq.
The random assignment RP q is characterized as follows. Fix an agent i of arbitrary
preference pi, and fix the draws f−i = (fj)j∈N\{i} ∈ [0, 1](|Nq |−1) for all agents other than
i. We then ask how low agent i’s draw should be for her to obtain a given object a ∈ O˜.
Specifically, we characterize the cutoff Tˆ qa ∈ [0, 1] for each object a ∈ O, which represents
the largest value of draw that would allow agent i to claim a. It is the critical value in
[0, 1] such that agent i can obtain a if and only if she draws fi less than that value. The
cutoffs depend on the random draws f−i, so they are random. It is useful to characterize
the random assignment RP q through the cutoffs.
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denote the per-unit number of agents of
type pi′ (except i if pi′ = pi) who have draws in (t, t′]. For any O′ ⊂ O and a ∈ O′, we let
mˆqa(O





be the per-unit number of agents in N q \ {i} whose most preferred object in O′ is a and
who have draws in (t, t′].
We then characterize the cutoffs for i by the following sequence of steps. (Note the
cutoffs depend on the preference type of i, but this dependence will be suppressed for
notational ease.) Let Oˆq(0) = O˜, tˆq(0) = 0, and xˆqa(0) = 0 for every a ∈ O˜. Given
Oˆq(0), tˆq(0), {xˆqa(0)}a∈O˜, . . . , Oˆq(v − 1), tˆq(v − 1), {xˆqa(v − 1)}a∈O˜, we let tˆqø := 1 and for
each a ∈ O, define
tˆqa(v) = sup
{
t ∈ [0, 1]




Oˆq(v) = Oˆq(v − 1) \ {a ∈ Oˆq(v − 1)|tˆqa(v) = tˆq(v)},(3.3)
xˆqa(v) = xˆ
q
a(v − 1) + mˆqa(Oˆq(v − 1); tˆq(v − 1), tˆq(v)).(3.4)
The last step vˆq := min{v′|tˆq(v′) = 1} is well defined since O is finite. For each a ∈ O, its
cutoff is given by Tˆ qa := {tˆq(v)|tˆq(v) = tˆqa(v)} if the set is nonempty, or else Tˆ qa = 1.
This characterization is explained as follows. Each step determines the cutoff of an
object. Suppose steps 1 through v − 1 have determined the v − 1 cutoffs for v − 1
objects. In particular, by the end of step v − 1, agents with draws less than tˆq(v − 1)
have consumed entire q copies of these objects and a fraction xqb(v− 1) of each remaining
object b ∈ Oq(v − 1).
Suppose the object a ∈ Oˆq(v − 1) is next to be consumed away, by agents with draws
less than its cutoff, tˆq(v) = Tˆ qa . An agent with draw f ∈ (tˆq(v − 1), Tˆ qa ] will consume
the object if and only if she prefers a to all other remaining objects. The total num-
ber of all such agents is q · mˆqa(Oˆq(v − 1); tˆq(v − 1), Tˆ qa ), and they consume a fraction
mˆqa(Oˆ
q(v − 1); tˆq(v − 1), Tˆ qa ) of that object. Hence, the total fraction of a consumed by
all agents with draws less than Tˆ qa must be
xˆqa(v − 1) + mˆqa(Oˆq(v − 1); tˆq(v − 1), Tˆ qa ).
For Tˆ qa to be the cutoff for a, this fraction must be no greater than one and must equal
one if Tˆ qa < 1. This condition requires Tˆ
q
a to equal tˆ
q
a(v), defined in (3.1). That a is the
first to be consumed away among the remaining objects is given by (3.2). The last two
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equations reset the remaining set of objects and the fractions consumed by step v, thus
continuing on the recursive procedure.
For each a,
τˆ qa (pi) := min{tˆq(v) ≤ Tˆ qa |a ∈ Chpi(Oˆq(v − 1))}
is the minimum value of draw for an agent with preference pi, to choose a (again if the
minimum is well defined, or else let τˆ qa (pi) := Tˆ
q
a ). In other words, an agent with pi has
a better choice than a available if she draws a number lower than τˆ qa (pi). Hence, the
minimum value τˆ qa (pi) is the highest cutoff of all objects that agent prefers over a, if that
cutoff, say Tˆ qb , is less than Tˆ
q
a . In that case, agent i will obtain a if and only if her draw




a , as is depicted in Figure 1.
0
fi such that i receives a︷ ︸︸ ︷
· · ·· · · Tˆ qb Tˆ qa 1
Figure 1: Cutoffs of objects under RP.
Therefore, the random priority random assignment is defined, for i ∈ N qpi and a ∈ O,
as RP qa (pi) := E[Tˆ qa− τˆ qa (pi)], where the expectation E is taken with respect to f−i = (fj)j 6=i
which is distributed i.i.d uniformly on [0, 1].
The random priority mechanism is widely used in practice, as mentioned in Introduc-
tion. Moreover, the mechanism is strategy-proof, that is, reporting the true ordinal
preferences is a dominant strategy for each agent. Furthermore, it is ex post efficient,
that is, the assignment after random draws are realized is Pareto efficient. However, the
mechanism may result in an ordinally inefficient allocation, as shown by the following
example adapted from Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001).
Example 1. Consider an economy Γ1 with 2 types of proper objects, a and b, each with
quota one. Let N1 = N1pi ∪ N1pi′ be the set of agents, with |N1pi | = |N1pi′| = 2. Preferences
of the agents are specified by
(pi(1), pi(2), pi(3)) = (a, b, ø),
(pi′(1), pi′(2), pi′(3)) = (b, a, ø).
10 YEON-KOO CHE AND FUHITO KOJIMA
In this economy, the random assignments under RP 1 can be easily calculated to be
















RP 1(pi′) = (RP 1a (pi
′), RP 1b (pi













Each agent ends up with her less preferred object with positive probability, since two
agents of any given preference type may get the two best draws, in which case the agent
with the second best draw will take the less preferred object.9 Obviously, any two agents of
different preferences can benefit from trading off the probability share of the less preferred





















Therefore the random priority assignment RP 1 is ordinally inefficient in this market.
Ordinal inefficiency of RP can be traced to the fact that the cutoffs of the objects are
random and personalized. In Example 1, Tˆ 1a < Tˆ
1
b occurs to agents in N
1
pi with positive
probability, and Tˆ 1a > Tˆ
1
b occurs to agents in N
1
pi′ with positive probability. In the former
case, an agent in N1pi may get b even though she prefers a to b. In the latter case, an
agent in N1pi′ may get a even though she prefers b to a. Hence both a B (RP 1,m1)b
and b B (RP 1,m1)a occur, resulting in cyclicity of the relation B(RP 1,m1) and hence
ordinal inefficiency of RP 1. As will be seen, as q →∞, the cutoffs of the random priority
mechanism converge to deterministic limits that are common to all agents, and this feature
ensures acyclicity of the binary relation B in the limit.
3.2. Probabilistic Serial Mechanism. Now we introduce the probabilistic serial
mechanism, which is an adaptation of the mechanism proposed by Bogomolnaia and
Moulin to our setting. The idea is to regard each object as a divisible object of “probability
shares.” Each agent “eats” probability share of the best available object with speed one
at every time t ∈ [0, 1] (object a is available at time t if less than q share of a has
been eaten away by time t). The resulting profile of shares of objects eaten by agents
by time 1 obviously corresponds to a symmetric random assignment, which we call the
probabilistic serial random assignment.
9For instance, let N1pi = {1, 2} and N1pi′ = {3, 4}. The draws can be f1 < f2 < f3 < f4, in which case 1
gets a and 2 gets b and 3 and 4 get nothing.
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Formally, the symmetric simultaneous eating algorithm,10 used to determine the
probabilistic serial random assignment, is defined as follows.
PS mechanism in the finite economy. For the q-economy Γq, the assignment
under the probabilistic serial mechanism is defined by the following sequence of steps. Let
Oq(0) = O˜, tq(0) = 0, and xqa(0) = 0 for every a ∈ O˜. Given Oq(0), tq(0), {xqa(0)}a∈O˜, . . . ,
Oq(v − 1), tq(v − 1), {xqa(v − 1)}a∈O˜, we let tqø := 1 and for each a ∈ O, define




Oq(v) = Oq(v − 1) \ {a ∈ Oq(v − 1)|tqa(v) = tq(v)},(3.7)
xqa(v) = x
q
a(v − 1) +mqa(Oq(v − 1))(tq(v)− tq(v − 1)).(3.8)
The last step v¯q := min{v′|tq(v′) = 1} is again well defined since O is finite. For each
a ∈ O˜, define its expiration date: T qa := {tq(v)|tq(v) = tqa(v)}. The expiration date for
object a is the time at which the eating of a is complete. When an agent starts eating
a given object a depends on his preference. Note that, unlike the cutoffs in the random
priority mechanism, the expiration dates are deterministic and common to all agents.
Aside from this important difference, though, expiration dates in PS play a similar role
as cutoffs in RP. In particular, they completely pin down the random assignment for the
agents. To begin, for pi ∈ Π, we let
τ qa (pi) := min{tq(v) ≤ T qa |a ∈ Chpi(Oq(v − 1))}
if the minimum is well defined, or else let τ qa (pi) := T
q
a . Then, agent i’s probability of
getting assigned to a ∈ O˜ is simply its duration of consumption of its preference type;
i.e., PSqa(pi) = T
q
a − τ qa (pi) if i ∈ N qpi.
PS mechanism in the limit economy. Although our primary interest is in a large
but finite economy, it is useful to define the PS mechanism in the limit economy, for it will
act as a benchmark for subsequent analysis. We again do so recursively. Let O∞(0) = O˜,
t∞(0) = 0, and x∞a (0) = 0 for every a ∈ O˜. Given O∞(0), t∞(0), {x∞a (0)}a∈O˜, . . . ,
10Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) consider a broader class of simultaneous eating algorithms, where
eating speeds may vary across agents and time.
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O∞(v − 1), t∞(v − 1), {x∞a (v − 1)}a∈O˜, we let t∞ø := 1 and for each a ∈ O, define




O∞(v) = O∞(v − 1) \ {a ∈ O∞(v − 1)|t∞a (v) = t∞(v)},(3.11)
x∞a (v) = x
∞
a (v − 1) +m∞a (O∞(v − 1))(t∞(v)− t∞(v − 1)).(3.12)
Let v¯∞ such that t∞(v¯∞) = 1. Consider the associated expiration dates: For each a ∈ O,
T∞a := {t∞(v)|t∞(v) = t∞a (v)} if the set is nonempty, or else T∞a := 1. Likewise, the
starting time for a for pi is defined as
τ∞a (pi) := min{t∞(v) ≤ T∞a |a ∈ Chpi(Oq(v − 1))}
if the minimum is well defined, or else let τ∞a (pi) := T
∞
a . The PS random assignment
in the limit is then defined to be duration of eating each object: for a ∈ O, PS∞a (pi) :=
T∞a − τ∞a (pi).
Adapting the argument of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001), we can show the following
(the proof is omitted).
Proposition 2. For any q ∈ N ∪ {∞}, PSq is ordinally efficient.
Example 2. Consider replica economies {Γq}q∈N with 2 types of proper objects, a and b,
each having quota q in the q-fold replica. Let N q = N qpi ∪N qpi′ be the set of agents in the
q-fold replica, with N qpi and N
q
pi′ containing 2q agents each. Assume that the preferences
of the agents are specified by
(pi(1), pi(2), pi(3)) = (a, b, ø),
(pi′(1), pi′(2), pi′(3)) = (b, a, ø).
Note that Γ1 corresponds to the market in Example 1.
For any q ∈ N, the random assignments under PSq can be easily calculated to be


























which is ordinally efficient.
Unlike cutoffs in the random priority mechanism, the expiration dates in the proba-
bilistic serial mechanism are deterministic and common to all agents. This explains, for
instance, why there is no cycle on a binary relation B(PSq,mq). To see this, suppose
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a B (PSq,mq) b. Then, there must be an agent who prefers a to b but ends up with b
with positive probability. This is possible only if Ta < Tb; or else, by the time the agent
finishes “eating” a (or something even better than a), b will have been completely eaten
away. Based on this logic, a cycle on B(PSq,mq) will require the order on the expiration
dates to be cyclic. And this is impossible.
One main drawback of the probabilistic serial mechanism, as identified by Bogomolnaia
and Moulin (2001), is that the mechanism is not strategy-proof. In other words, an agent
may be made better off by reporting a false ordinal preference.
Before proceeding to our main results, we show that PSq converges to PS∞ as q →∞.
The convergence occurs in all standard metrics; for concreteness, we define the metric by
||φ − φˆ|| := suppi∈Π,a∈O |φa(pi) − φˆa(pi)| for any pair of symmetric random assignments φ
and φˆ. The convergence of PSq to PS∞ is immediate if {Γq}q∈N are replica economies. In
this case, mqa(O
′) = m∞a (O
′) for all q and a, so the recursive definitions, (3.5), (3.6), (3.7),
and (3.8), of the PS procedure for each q-economy all coincide with those of the limiting
economy, namely (3.9), (3.10), (3.11), and (3.12). The other cases are established.
Theorem 1. ||PSq − PS∞|| → 0 as q → ∞. Further, PSq = PS∞ for all q ∈ N if
{Γq}q∈N are replica economies.
This theorem shows that PS in the limit economy captures the limiting behavior of
PS in a large but finite economy. In this sense, Theorem 1 provides a foundation for a
modeling approach that models PS directly in the continuum economy.
4. Main Result: Asymptotic Equivalence
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the random
priority and probabilistic serial mechanisms in large markets. We now provide our main
finding, beginning with an example.
Example 3. Consider replica economies {Γq}q∈N of the base economy introduced in Ex-
ample 1. That is, there are 2 proper object types, a and b, each having quota q in the
q-fold replica. Let N q = N qpi ∪N qpi′ be the set of agents in the q-fold replica, with N qpi and
N qpi′ containing 2q agents each. Assume that the preferences of the agents are specified by
(pi(1), pi(2), pi(3)) = (a, b, ø),
(pi′(1), pi′(2), pi′(3)) = (b, a, ø).
In Examples 1 and 2, we have seen that PS is ordinally efficient in all q-economies, while
RP results in an ordinally inefficient random assignment in the base economy.
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Figure 1. Horizontal axis: Market size q. Vertical axis: RP qb (pi) = ||RP q − PSq||.
Figure 1 plots the misallocation probability RP qb (pi) = ||RP q − PSq|| as a function of
the size of the market q. Notice that the misallocation probability is positive for all q but
declines and approaches zero as q becomes large. Correspondingly, one can see that the
cutoff of each good converges to 1/2, the expiration date of both goods in probabilistic
serial.
Figure 1 suggests the asymptotic equivalence of the two mechanisms in a specific exam-
ple. The following theorem indeed shows that the equivalence holds generally for arbitrary
preferences in the limit of any sequence of economies as q →∞ (beyond the simple cases
of replica economies).
Theorem 2. ||RP q−PS∞|| → 0 as q →∞. Furthermore, ||RP q−PSq|| → 0 as q →∞.
We shall give intuition of Theorem 2. The starting point is a recursive formulation of
the random priority mechanism given by (3.1)-(3.4). The formulation suggests that the
assignment under the random priority mechanism is similar to the one in the probabilistic
serial mechanism, except that in the random priority mechanism the random cutoffs
replace the expiration dates in the probabilistic serial mechanism. The basic idea of the
proof is to show that the cutoff for each object type in RP converges to the expiration
date of that object type in the PS in probability as the size of the market approaches
infinity. The convergence will happen if the consumption of each object type in RP
during all relevant intervals is close to the corresponding consumption in PS. This will
happen under RP in large markets as the law of large numbers kicks in: with a very high
probability, objects are consumed almost proportionately to the number of agents who
like that object best among available ones. The proof makes this intuition precise by
showing inductively that, with high probability, all cutoffs in RP are sufficiently close to
corresponding expiration dates in PS.
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Example 3 also shows that the RP and PS assignments remain different for all finite
values of q. This means that Theorem 2 is tight; we cannot generally expect that the
RP assignment coincides with the PS assignment in a finite economy. In fact, we have a
stronger characterization in this regard.
Proposition 3. Consider a family {Γq}q∈N of replica economies. Then, RP q is ordinally
efficient for some q ∈ N if and only if RP q′ is ordinally efficient for every q′ ∈ N. That is,
the random priority assignment is ordinally efficient for all replica economies or ordinally
inefficient for all of them.
In particular, Proposition 3 implies that the ordinal inefficiency of RP does not disap-
pear completely in any finitely replicated economy if the random priority assignment is
ordinally inefficient in the base economy. This result also suggests that it may be mis-
leading to simply examine whether a mechanism suffers ordinal inefficiencies; even if a
mechanism is ordinally inefficient, the magnitude of the inefficiency may be very small,
as is the case with RP.
5. Discussion
5.1. Random Priority Mechanism in the Limit. Our main result has been estab-
lished without defining the RP in the limit economy. This omission entails no loss for our
purpose, since we are primarily interested in the behavior of a large, but finite, economy.
Further, defining the RP in the limit economy may require one to describe the aggregate
behavior of independent lottery drawing for a continuum of population, which can be
problematic.11
There is a way to define the RP in the limit economy, without appealing to a law of
large numbers, as has been done by Abdulkadirog˘lu, Che, and Yasuda (2008). To do so,
we first augment the type of an agent to include his random draw, which is not observed
until the random priority is drawn. Formally, a generic agent in the limit economy has
type (pi, f) representing his preference pi and the draw f (which is possibly unobserved
by the agent themselves until proper time). The set of agents in the limit economy is
represented by the product space Π× [0, 1] endowed with a product measure µ× ν, such
that µ(pi) = m∞pi for all pi and ν is uniform with ν([0, f ]) = f for each f ∈ [0, 1]. In
words, the measure of agents with draws less than f is precisely f . This corresponds to
the heuristics that the agents in the limit economy obtain random draws in [0, 1] and a
11See Judd (1985) for a classic reference for the associated conceptual problems, and Sun (2006) for a
recent treatment.
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law of large number holds for the aggregate distribution (although it is never formally
invoked). Again, we assume that a lower draw gives a higher priority for an agent.
As with q-economy with q ∈ N, we characterize the RP∞ via the cutoff values of the
draws for each object. A cutoff Tˆ∞a for object a ∈ O is defined such that an agent can
obtain a (when he/she wishes) if and only if f < Tˆ∞a . As before, we then define the cutoffs
recursively by a sequence of steps. Let Oˆ∞(0) = O˜, tˆ∞(0) = 0, and xˆ∞a (0) = 0 for every
a ∈ O˜. Given Oˆ∞(0), tˆ∞(0), {xˆ∞a (0)}a∈O˜, . . . , Oˆ∞(v − 1), tˆ∞(v − 1), {xˆ∞a (v − 1)}a∈O˜, we
let tˆ∞ø := 1 and for each a ∈ O, define
tˆ∞a (v) = sup
{
t ∈ [0, 1]




Oˆ∞(v) = Oˆ∞(v − 1) \ {a ∈ Oˆ∞(v − 1)|tˆ∞a (v) = t∞(v)},(5.3)
xˆ∞a (v) = xˆ
∞
a (v − 1) +m∞a (Oˆ∞(v − 1))(tˆ∞(v)− tˆ∞(v − 1)).(5.4)
Comparing (3.9)-(3.12) with (5.1)-(5.4) makes it plainly evident that Tˆ∞a = T
∞
a , ∀a ∈
O, with the following conclusion:
Proposition 4. RP∞ = PS∞.
This proposition and Theorem 2 imply
Corollary 1. ||RP q −RP∞|| → 0 as q →∞.
Thus RP in the limit economy captures the limiting behavior of RP in a large but finite
economy. In this sense, Proposition 4 gives a foundation for a modeling approach that
models the random priority mechanism directly in the continuum economy, as has been
done, for instance, by Abdulkadirog˘lu, Che, and Yasuda (2008).
5.2. Market Design in Large Economies. A recurring theme in economics is that
large economies can make things “right” in many settings, and our result shares the same
theme. Nevertheless, no single economic insight appears to explain the benefit of large
economies. And it is important to investigate what precisely the large economy buys.
To begin, it is often the case that the large economy limits individuals’ abilities and
incentives to manipulate the mechanism. This is clearly the case in the Walrasian mech-
anism in exchange economy, as has been shown by Roberts and Postlewaite (1976). It is
also the case with the deferred acceptance algorithm in two-sided matching (Kojima and
Pathak (2008)) and the probabilistic serial mechanism in one-sided matching (Kojima and
Manea (2008)). Even this property is not to be taken for granted, however. The so-called
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Boston mechanism provides an example. The Boston mechanism has been used to
place students in public schools. In that mechanism, a school first admits the students
who rank it the first, and if, and only if, there are seats left, does it admit those who rank
it second, and so forth. It is well known that the students have incentives to misreport
preferences in such a mechanism, and this manipulation incentives do not disappear as
the economy becomes large.12
Second, one may expect that, with the diminished manipulation incentives, efficiency
would be easier to attain in a large economy. The asymptotic ordinal efficiency we find
for the RP supports this impression. However, even some reasonable mechanisms fail the
asymptotic ordinal efficiency. Take the case of the deferred acceptance algorithm
with multiple tie-breaking (DA-MTB), an adaptation of the celebrated algorithm
proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) to the problem of assigning objects to agents such
as student assignment in public schools (see Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and Roth (2005)).
In DA-MTB, each object type randomly and independently orders agents and, given the
ordering, the assignment is decided by conducting the agent-proposing deferred acceptance
algorithm with respect to the submitted preferences and the randomly decided priority
profile. It turns out DA-MTB fails even ex post efficiency, let alone ordinal efficiency.
Moreover, these inefficiencies do not disappear in the limit economy, as has been shown
by Abdulkadirog˘lu, Che, and Yasuda (2008).
Third, one plausible conjecture may be that the asymptotic ordinal efficiency is a nec-
essary consequence of a mechanism that produces an ex post efficient assignment in every
finite economy. This conjecture turns out to be false. Consider a family {Γq}q∈N of
replica economies and what we call a replication-invariant random priority mecha-
nism, RIRP q, defined as follows. First, in the given q-economy, define a correspondence
γ : N1  N q such that |γ(i)| = q for each i ∈ N1, γ(i) ∩ γ(j) = ∅ if i 6= j, and all agents
in γ(i) have the same preference as i. Call γ(i) i’s clones in the q-fold replica. Let each
set γ(i) of clones of agent i randomly draws a number fi independently from a uniform
distribution on [0, 1]. Second, all the clones with the smallest draw receive their most pre-
ferred object, the clones with the second-smallest draw receive their most preferred object
from the remaining ones, and so forth. This procedure induces a random assignment. It
is clear that RIRP q = RP 1 for any q-fold replica Γq. Therefore ||RIRP q − RP 1|| → 0
as q → ∞. Since RP 1 may not be ordinally efficient, the limit random assignment of
RIRP q as q →∞ is not ordinally efficient in general.
12See Kojima and Pathak (2008) for a concrete example on this point.
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Above all, our analysis shows the equivalence of two different mechanisms beyond show-
ing certain asymptotic properties of given mechanisms. Such an equivalence is not ex-
pected even for a large economy, and has few analogues in the literature.
5.3. Group-specific Priorities. In some applications, the social planner may need to
give higher priorities to a subset of agents over others. For example, when allocating
graduate dormitory rooms, the housing office at Harvard University assigns rooms to
first year students first, and then assigns remaining rooms to existing students. Other
schools prioritize housing assignments based on students’ seniorities and/or their academic
performances.13
To model such a situation, assume that each student belongs to one of the classes C and,
for each c ∈ C, let gc be a density function over [0, 1]. The asymmetric random priority
mechanism associated with g = (gc)c∈C lets each agent i in class c to draw fi according
to the density function gc independently from others, and the agent with the smallest
draw among all agents receives her most preferred object, the agent with the second-
smallest draw receives his most preferred object from the remaining ones, and so forth.
The random priority mechanism is a special case in which gc is a uniform distribution on
[0, 1] for each c ∈ C.
The asymmetric probabilistic serial mechanism associated with g is defined by simply
letting agents in class c to eat with speed gc(t) at each time t ∈ [0, 1]. The probabilistic
serial mechanism is a special case in which gc is a uniform distribution on [0, 1] for each
c ∈ C.
It is not difficult to see that our results generalize to a general profile of distributions
g. In particular, given any g, the asymmetric random priority mechanism associated with
g and the asymmetric probabilistic serial mechanism associated with g converge to the
same limit as q →∞.
5.4. Unequal Number of Copies. We focused on a setting in which there are q copies
of each object type in the q-economy. It is straightforward to extend our results as long
as quotas of object types grows proportionately. More specifically, if there exist positive
integers (qa)a∈O such that the quota of object type a is qaq in the q-economy, then our
result extends with little modification of the proof.
13For instance, Columbia University gives advantage in lottery draw based on seniority in its under-
graduate housing assignment. Technion gives assignment priorities to students based on both seniority
and academic performance (Perach, Polak, and Rothblum (2007)). Claremont McKenna College and
Pitzer College give students assignment priority based on the number of credits they have earned.
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On the other hand, we need some assumption about the growth rate of quotas. Suppose
that, for instance, quotas of some objects are q but quotas of others stay at one. Then, one
can easily create an example in which random priority assignment of objects with quota
one does not converge to those under the probabilistic serial mechanism. However, such
an example does not seem to be a large problem, since in the large market, assignment
of object types with small quotas has only limited influence on overall welfare in the
economy.
5.5. Multi-Unit Demands. Consider a generalization of our basic setting, in which
each agent can obtain multiple units of objects. More specifically, we assume that there
is a fixed integer k such that each agent can receive k objects. When k = 1, the model
reduces to the model of the current paper. Assignment of popular courses in schools is
one example of such a multiple unit assignment problem. See, for example, Kojima (2008)
for formal definition of the model.
We consider two generalizations of the random priority mechanism to the current set-
ting. In the once-and-for-all random priority mechanism, each agent i randomly
draws a number fi independently from a uniform distribution on [0, 1] and, given the or-
dering, the agent with the smallest draw receives her most preferred k objects, the agent
with the second-smallest draw receives his most preferred k objects from the remaining
ones, and so forth. In the draft random priority mechanism, each agent i randomly
draws a number fi independently from a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Second, the agent
with the smallest draw receives her most preferred object, the agent with the second-
smallest draw receives his most preferred object from the remaining ones, and so forth.
Then agents obtain a random draw again and repeat the procedure k times.
We introduce two generalizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism. In the multiunit-
eating probabilistic serial mechanism, each agent “eats” her k most preferred available
objects with speed one at every time t ∈ [0, 1]. In the one-at-a-time probabilistic se-
rial mechanism, each agent “eats” the best available object with speed one at every time
t ∈ [0, k].
Our analysis can be adapted to this situation to show that the once-and-for-all random
priority mechanism converges to the same limit as the multiunit-eating probabilistic serial
mechanism, whereas the draft random priority mechanism converges to the same limit as
the one-at-a-time probabilistic serial mechanism.
It is easy to see that the multiunit-eating probabilistic serial mechanism may not be
ordinally efficient, while the one-at-a-time probabilistic serial mechanism is ordinally effi-
cient. This may shed light on some issues in multiple unit assignment. It is well known
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that the once-and-for-all random priority mechanism is ex post efficient, but the mecha-
nism is rarely used in practice. Rather, the draft mechanism is often used in application,
for instance sports drafting and allocations of courses in business schools. One of the rea-
sons may be that the once-and-for-all random priority mechanism is ordinally inefficient
even in the limit economy, whereas the draft random priority mechanism converges to an
ordinally efficient mechanism as the economy becomes large, as in course allocation in
schools.
6. Related literature
Pathak (2006) compares random priority and probabilistic serial using data in the
assignment of about 8,000 students in the public school system of New York City. He
finds that many students obtain a better random assignment in the probabilistic serial
mechanism, but he notes that the difference seems small. The current paper complements
his study, by explaining why the two mechanisms are not expected to differ much in some
school choice setting.
Kojima and Manea (2008) find that truthtelling becomes a dominant strategy under
probabilistic serial when there are a large number of copies of each object type. Their
paper left the asymptotic behavior of random priority unanswered. The current paper
give an answer to that question, providing further understanding of random mechanisms
in large markets. Furthermore, our analysis provides intuition for the result of Kojima
and Manea (2008). To see this point, first recall that truthtelling is a dominant strategy
in the random priority mechanism. Since our result shows that the probabilistic serial
mechanism is close to the random priority mechanism in a large economy, this observation
implies that it is difficult to profitably manipulate the probabilistic serial mechanism.14
Manea (2006) shows that random priority results in an ordinally inefficient assignment
for most preference profiles when there are a large number of object types and the number
of copies of each object type remains one. We note that his result does not contradict
ours because of a number of differences. First, Manea (2006) keeps the number of copies
of each object type constant (at one) and increases the number of object types while our
model increases the number of copies while keeping the number of object types fixed.
Second, his theorem focuses on whether there is some ordinal inefficiency in the random
priority assignment, while we investigate how much difference there is between the random
priority and the probabilistic serial mechanisms, and how they change as the market size
14However, the result of Kojima and Manea (2008) cannot be derived from the current paper since
they establish a dominant strategy result in a large but finite economies, while our equivalence result
holds only in the limit as the market size approaches infinity.
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grows. As suggested by Proposition 3, this distinction is important particularly for the
welfare assessment of RP.
While analysis of large markets is relatively new in matching and resource allocation
problems, it has a long tradition in many areas of economics. For example, Roberts
and Postlewaite (1976) show that, under some conditions, the Walrasian mechanism is
difficult to manipulate in large exchange economies.15 Similarly, incentive properties of
a large class of double auction mechanisms are studied by, among others, Gresik and
Satterthwaite (1989), Rustichini, Satterthwaite, and Williams (1994), and Cripps and
Swinkels (2006). Two-sided matching is an area closely related to our model. In that
context, Roth and Peranson (1999), Immorlica and Mahdian (2005) and Kojima and
Pathak (2008) show that the deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley
(1962) becomes increasingly hard to manipulate as the number of participants becomes
large. Many of these papers show particular properties of given mechanisms, such as
incentive compatibility and efficiency. One of the notable features of the current paper
is that we show the equivalence of apparently dissimilar mechanisms, beyond specific
properties of given mechanisms.
Finally, our paper is part of a growing literature on random assignment mechanisms.16
The probabilistic serial mechanism is generalized to allow for weak preferences, existing
property rights, and multi-unit demand by Katta and Sethuraman (2006), Yilmaz (2006),
and Kojima (2008), respectively. Kesten (2008) introduces two mechanisms, one of which
is motivated by the random priority mechanism, and shows that these mechanisms are
equivalent to the probabilistic serial mechanism. In the scheduling problem (a special
case of the current environment), Cre`s and Moulin (2001) show that the probabilistic
serial mechanism is group strategy-proof and ordinally dominates the random priority
mechanism but these two mechanisms converge to each other as the market size approaches
infinity, and Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2002) give two characterizations of the probabilistic
serial mechanism.
7. Conclusion
Although the random priority (random serial dictatorship) mechanism is widely used for
assigning objects to individuals, there has been an increasing interest in the probabilistic
serial mechanism as a potentially superior alternative. The tradeoffs associated with
these mechanisms are multifaceted and difficult to evaluate in a finite economy. Yet,
15See also Jackson (1992) and Jackson and Manelli (1997).
16Characterizations of ordinal efficiency are given by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003a) and McLen-
nan (2002).
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we have shown that the tradeoffs disappear, as the two mechanisms become effectively
identical, in the large economy. More specifically, given a set of object types, the random
assignments in these mechanisms converge to each other as the number of copies of each
object type approaches infinity. This equivalence implies that the well-known concerns
about the two mechanisms — the inefficiency of random priority and the incentive issue
about probabilistic serial — abate in large markets.
Our equivalence is asymptotic and the random priority and the probabilistic serial
mechanisms do not exactly coincide in large but finite economies. How these competing
mechanisms perform in such a case remains an interesting open question.
Appendix
A. Proof of Theorem 1







∨m∞a (O′)|O′ ⊂ O, a ∈ O′,m∞a (O′) > 0
}}
,(A1)
and let K := min{1− x∞a (v) | a ∈ O∞(v), v < v¯∞} > 0.
Fix any  > 0 such that
2L4v¯
∞
 < min{ min
v∈1,...,v¯∞
|t∞(v)− t∞(v − 1)|, K}.(A2)
By assumption there exists Q such that, for each q > Q,
|mqa(O′)−m∞a (O′)| < ,∀O′ ⊂ O˜, ∀a ∈ O′.(A3)
Fix any such q. We show that T qa ∈ (t∞(v)− L4v, t∞(v) +L4v) if and only if t∞a (v) =





) if and only if t∞a (v
′) = t∞(v′), and further that, for each a ∈ O∞(v−1),
xqa(k) ∈ (x∞a (v − 1) − L4(v−1), x∞a (v − 1) + L4(v−1)), where k is the largest element of
Jv−1 := {i| there exists a s.t. tqa(i) = tq(i) and T∞a = t∞(v − 1)}. We shall then prove
that T qa ∈ (t∞(v) − L4v, t∞(v) + L4v) if and only if t∞a (v) = t∞(v), and that, for each
a ∈ O∞(v), xqa(l) ∈ (x∞a (v)− L4v, x∞a (v) + L4v), where l is the largest element of Jv.
Let k be the largest element of Jv−1. It then follows that Oq(k) = O∞(v − 1).
Claim 1. For any a ∈ O∞(v − 1), tqa(k + 1) > t∞(v)− L4v−2.
Proof. Let a be one of the first objects to expire in O∞(v− 1) under PSq. Assume, for
contradiction, that
tqa(k + 1) ≤ t∞(v)− L4v−2.(A4)
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Recall, by inductive assumption, that
xqa(k) < x
∞
a (v − 1) + L4(v−1).(A5)
Thus,





q(k))(tqa(k + 1)− tqa(k))
≤ xqa(k) +mqa(Oq(k))(t∞(v)− L4v−2− t∞(v − 1) + L4(v−1))
≤ xqa(k) +mqa(Oq(k))[t∞(v)− t∞(v − 1)− L4v−3]
< x∞a (v − 1) + L4(v−1)+m∞a (O∞(v − 1))[t∞(v)− t∞(v − 1)− L4v−3] + ,(A6)
where the first equality follows from definition of PSq (3.8), the first inequality follows
from the inductive assumption and (A4), the second inequality follows from (A1), and
the third inequality follows from (A2), (A3) and (A5).
There are two cases. Suppose first m∞a (O
∞(v − 1)) = 0. Then, the last line of (A6)
becomes
x∞a (v − 1) + L4(v−1)+ ,
which is strictly less than 1, since a ∈ O∞(v − 1) and since (A2) holds. Suppose next
m∞a (O
∞(v − 1)) > 0. Then, the last line of (A6) equals
x∞a (v − 1) + L4(v−1)+m∞a (O∞(v − 1))[t∞(v)− t∞(v − 1)− L4v−3] + 
< x∞a (v − 1) +m∞a (O∞(v − 1))[t∞(v)− t∞(v − 1)]
≤ 1,
where the first inequality follows from (A1), and the second follows since a ∈ O∞(v − 1).
In either case, we have a contradiction to the fact that a expires at step k + 1. ‖
Claim 2. Let a be the object that expires the last in the q-economy among the set
{b ∈ O∞(v − 1)|t∞b (v) = t∞(v)}. If a expires at stage l ≥ k + 1 in the q-economy, then
tqa(l) ≤ t∞(v) + L4v−2.
Proof. If t∞(v) = 1, then the claim is trivially true. Thus, let us assume t∞a (v) < 1.
This implies m∞a (O
∞(v − 1)) > 0. For that case suppose, for contradiction, that
tqa(l) > t
∞(v) + L4v−2.(A7)

















∞(v − 1))[tq(l)− tq(k)]
> x∞a (v − 1)− L4(v−1)+mqa(O∞(v − 1))[t∞(v) + L4v−2− t∞(v − 1)− L4(v−1)]
≥ x∞a (v − 1)− L4(v−1)+m∞a (O∞(v − 1))[t∞(v)− t∞(v − 1) + L4v−3]
> x∞a (v − 1) +m∞a (O∞(v − 1))[t∞(v)− t∞(v − 1)]
= x∞a (v) = 1,
where the first equality follows from (3.8), the first inequality follows since mqa(O
q(j −
1)) ≥ mqa(Oq(k)) for any j ≥ k + 1 by Oq(j − 1) ⊆ Oq(k), the second equality from
Oq(k) = O∞(v − 1), the second inequality follows from the inductive assumption and
(A7), the third inequality follows from the assumption (A1), and the fourth inequality
follows from (A1) and the assumption m∞a (O
∞(v − 1)) > 0. Thus xqa(l) > 1, which
contradicts the definition of xqa(l). ‖
Claim 3. If a ∈ O∞(v) and v < v¯∞, then T qa > t∞(v) + L4v.
Proof. Suppose otherwise. Let c be the object in O∞(v) that expires the first in the
q-economy. Let j be the step at which it expires. Then, we must have tqc(j) < 1 and
xqc(j) = 1. Since c is the first object to expire in O
∞(v), at each of steps k + 1, . . . , j − 1,
some object in O∞(v−1)\O∞(v) = {a ∈ O∞(v−1)|t∞a (v) = t∞(v)} expires. (If j = k+1,
then no other object expires in between step k and step j.) By the previous analysis, this







q(i− 1))(tq(i)− tq(i− 1))
≤ xqc(k) +mqc(Oq(k))(tq(k + 1)− tq(k)) +mqc(Oq(j − 1))(tq(j)− tq(k + 1))
≤ x∞c (v − 1) + L4(v−1)+ (m∞c (Oq(k)) + ) ((t∞(v) + L4v−2)− (t∞(v − 1)− L4(v−1)))
+ (m∞a (O
q(j)) + ) (L4v− L4v−2)
≤ x∞c (v) + L4v+1
≤ 1−K + L4v¯∞
< 1,
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which contradicts the assumption that c expires at step j. ‖
The arguments so far prove that T qa ∈ (t∞(v) − L4v−2, t∞(v) + L4v−2) ⊂ (t∞(v) −
L4v, t∞(v) + L4v) if and only if T∞a = t
∞(v). It now remains to prove the following:
Claim 4. For each a ∈ O∞(v), xqa(l) ∈ (x∞a (v)−L4v, x∞a (v)+L4v), where l is the largest
element of Jv.







q(j − 1))(tq(j)− tq(j − 1))
≤ xqa(k) +mqa(Oq(k))(tq(k + 1)− tq(k)) +mqa(Oq(l))(tq(l)− tq(k + 1))
≤ x∞a (v − 1) + L4(v−1)+ (m∞a (Oq(k)) + ) (t∞(v)− t∞(v − 1) + 2L4v−2)
+ (m∞a (O
q(l)) + ) (2L4v−2)
< x∞a (v − 1) + (m∞a (O∞(v − 1))) (t∞(v)− t∞(v − 1)) + L4v
= x∞a (v) + L
4v.
A symmetric argument yields xqa(l) ≥ x∞a (v)− L4v. ‖
We have thus completed the recursive argument, which taken together proves that
T qa ∈ (t∞(v) − L4v, t∞(v) + L4v) if and only if t∞a (v) = t∞(v), for any q > Q for some
Q ∈ N. Since  > 0 can be arbitrarily small, T qa → T∞a as q →∞. Since there are only a
finite number of objects and a finite number of preference types, ||PSq − PS∞|| → 0 as
q →∞.
B. Proof of Theorem 2







∨m∞a (O′)|O′ ⊂ O, a ∈ O′,m∞a (O′) > 0
}}
,(B1)
and let K := min{1− x∞a (v) | a ∈ O∞(v), v < v¯∞} > 0.
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Fix an agent i0 of preference type pi0 ∈ Π and consider a random assignment for agents
of type pi0. Consider the following events:
17




a (v − 1)− L4(v−1), t∞a (v)− L4v−2) < m∞pi [t∞a (v)− t∞a (v − 1)− L4v−3],




a (v − 1) + L4(v−1), t∞a (v) + L4v−2) ≥ m∞pi [t∞a (v)− t∞a (v − 1) + L4v−3], v 6= v¯∞,
Eq2(v¯
∞, pi) : {f−i0 ∈ [0, 1]|N
q−1|},




a (v − 1)− L4(v−1), t∞a (v) + L4v−2) < m∞pi [t∞a (v)− t∞a (v − 1) + 2L4v−2],




a (v)− L4v−2, t∞a (v) + L4v) < m∞pi × 2L4v,




a (v)− L4v−2, t∞a (v) + L4v−2) < m∞pi × 3L4v−2,




a (v − 1) + L4(v−1), t∞a (v)− L4v−2) ≥ m∞pi [t∞a (v)− t∞a (v − 1)− L4v−2].
Lemma 1. For any  > 0 such that
2L4v¯
∞
 < min{ min
v∈1,...,v¯∞
{t∞(v)− t∞(v − 1)}, K},(B2)
there exists Q such that the following is true for any q > Q: If the realization of f−i0 is








5(v, pi) and E
q
6(v, pi) hold for all
v ∈ {1, . . . , v¯∞} and pi ∈ Π with m∞pi > 0, then Tˆ qa ∈ (t∞(v) − L4v, t∞(v) + L4v) if and
only if t∞a (v) = t
∞(v).
Proof. There exists Q such that ∑
pi∈Π:m∞pi =0
mqpi < ,(B3)









5(v, pi) and E
q
6(v, pi) hold for all v, pi with m
∞
pi > 0
as described in the statement of the Lemma. We show the lemma inductively. Suppose for
any v′ ≤ v−1, Tˆ qa ∈ (t∞(v′)−L4v′, t∞(v′)+L4v′) if and only if t∞a (v′) = t∞(v′), and further
that, for each a ∈ O∞(v−1), xˆqa(k) ∈ (x∞a (v−1)−L4(v−1), x∞a (v−1)+L4(v−1)), where k
is the largest element of Jˆv−1 := {i| there exists a s.t. tˆqa(i) = tˆq(i) and T∞a = t∞(v− 1)}.
We shall then prove that Tˆ qa ∈ (t∞(v)− L4v, t∞(v) + L4v) if and only if t∞a (v) = t∞(v),
and that, for each a ∈ O∞(v), xˆqa(l) ∈ (x∞a (v)−L4v, x∞a (v) +L4v), where l is the largest
element of Jˆv.
Let k be the largest element of Jˆv−1. It then follows that Oˆq(k) = O∞(v − 1). Fix any
a ∈ O∞(v − 1).
17Eq2(v¯
∞, pi) holds for any realization of ordering. The notation is introduced only for expositional
simplicity in what follows.
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Claim 5. tˆqa(k + 1) > t
∞(v)− L4v−2 for all a ∈ O∞(v − 1).
Proof. Let a be the first object to expire in O∞(v − 1) under RP q. Assume, for
contradiction, that
tˆqa(k + 1) ≤ t∞(v)− L4v−2.(B4)
Recall, by inductive assumption, that
xˆqa(k) < x
∞
a (v − 1) + L4(v−1).(B5)
Thus,





q(k); tˆq(k), tˆqa(k + 1))
≤ xˆqa(k) + mˆqa(Oˆq(k); t∞(v − 1)− L4(v−1), t∞(v)− L4v−2)
< x∞a (v − 1) + L4(v−1)+m∞a (O∞(v − 1))[t∞(v)− t∞(v − 1)− L4v−3] + ,(B6)
where the first equality follows from (3.4) in the definition of RP q, the first inequality
follows from the inductive assumption and (B4), and the second inequality follows from
the assumption that Eq1(v, pi) holds and conditions (B3) and (B5).
There are two cases. Suppose first m∞a (O
∞(v − 1)) = 0. Then, the last line of (B6)
becomes
x∞a (v − 1) + L4(v−1)+ ,
which is strictly less than 1, since a ∈ O∞(v − 1) and since (B2) holds. Suppose next
m∞a (O
∞(v − 1)) > 0. Then, the last line of (B6) equals
x∞a (v − 1) + L4(v−1)+m∞a (O∞(v − 1))[t∞(v)− t∞(v − 1)− L4v−3] + 
< x∞a (v − 1) +m∞a (O∞(v − 1))[t∞(v)− t∞(v − 1)]
≤ 1,
where the first inequality follows from (B1), and the second follows since a ∈ O∞(v − 1).
In either case, we have a contradiction to the fact that a expires at step k + 1. ‖
Claim 6. Let a be the object that expires the last, in RP q with the given order f , in the
q-economy among the set {b ∈ O∞(v − 1)|t∞b (v) = t∞(v)}. Suppose a expires at stage
l ≥ k + 1 in the q-economy. Then,
tˆq(l) ≤ t∞(v) + L4v−2.(B7)
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Proof. If t∞(v) = 1, then the claim is trivially true. Thus, let us assume t∞(v) < 1.
This implies m∞a (O
∞(v − 1)) > 0. For that case suppose, for contradiction, that













q(k); tˆq(j − 1), tˆq(j))
= xˆqa(k) + mˆ
q
a(O
∞(v − 1); tˆq(k), tˆq(l))
> x∞a (v − 1)− L4(v−1)+ mˆqa(O∞(v − 1); t∞(v − 1) + L4(v−1), t∞(v) + L4v−2)
≥ x∞a (v − 1)− L4(v−1)+m∞a (O∞(v − 1))[t∞(v)− t∞(v − 1) + L4v−3]
> x∞a (v − 1) +m∞a (O∞(v − 1))[t∞(v)− t∞(v − 1)]
= x∞a (v) = 1,
where the first equality follows from (3.4), the first inequality follows since mˆqa(Oˆ
q(j −
1); t, t′) ≥ mqa(Oˆq(k); t, t′) for any j ≥ k + 1 and t ≤ t′ by Oˆq(j − 1) ⊆ Oˆq(k), the
second equality from Oˆq(k) = O∞(v − 1) and the definition of mˆqa, the second inequality
follows from the inductive assumption and (B8), the third inequality follows from the
assumption that Eq2(v, pi) holds, and the fourth inequality follows from (B1) and the
assumption m∞a (O
∞(v − 1)) > 0. Thus xˆqa(l) > 1, which contradicts the definition of
xqa(l). ‖
Claim 7. If a ∈ O∞(v) and v < v¯∞, then Tˆ qa > t∞(v) + L4v.
Proof. Suppose otherwise. Let c be the object in O∞(v) that expires the first in the
q-economy. Let j be the step at which it expires. Then, we must have
tˆqc(j) ≤ t∞(v) + L4v,(B9)
and xˆqc(j) = 1. Since c is the first object to expire in O
∞(v), at each of steps k+1, . . . , j−1,
some object in O∞(v−1)\O∞(v) = {a ∈ O∞(v−1)|t∞a (v) = t∞(v)} expires. (If j = k+1,
then no other object expires in between step k and step j.) By Claim 5, this implies
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q(i− 1); tˆq(i− 1), tˆq(i))
≤ xˆqc(k) + mˆqc(Oˆq(k); tˆq(k), tˆq(k + 1)) + mˆqc(Oˆq(j − 1); tˆq(k + 1), tˆq(j))
≤ xˆqc(k) + mˆqc(Oˆq(k); t∞(v − 1)− L4(v−1), t∞(v) + L4v−2)
+mˆqc(Oˆ
q(j − 1); t∞(v)− L4v−2, t∞(v) + L4v)
≤ x∞c (v − 1) + L4(v−1)+m∞c (O∞(v − 1))[t∞(v)− t∞(v − 1) + 2L4v−2]
+m∞c (Oˆ
q(j − 1)× 2L4v+ 
≤ x∞c (v) + L4v+1
≤ 1−K + L4v¯∞
< 1,
where the first equality follows from (3.4), the first inequality follows since mˆqc(Oˆ
q(j −
1); t, t′) ≥ mqc(Oˆq(i− 1); t, t′) for any j ≥ i by Oˆq(j − 1) ⊆ Oˆq(i− 1), the second inequal-
ity follows from the inductive assumption, Claims 5 and 6, the third inequality follows
from the inductive assumption, Eq3(v, pi), E
q
4(v, pi) and (B3), the fourth inequality follows
from (3.12) and (B1), the fifth inequality follows from the definition of K, and the last
inequality follows from the assumption that 2L4v¯
∞
 < K. Thus we obtain xˆqc(j) < 1,
which contradicts the assumption that c expires at step j. ‖
The arguments so far prove that Tˆ qa ∈ (t∞(v) − L4v−2, t∞(v) + L4v−2) ⊂ (t∞(v) −
L4v, t∞(v) + L4v) if and only if T∞a = t
∞(v). It now remains to show the following.
Claim 8. For each a ∈ O∞(v), xqa(l) ∈ (x∞a (v)−L4v, x∞a (v)+L4v), where l is the largest
element of Jˆv.
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q(j − 1); tˆq(j − 1), tˆq(j))
≤ xˆqa(k) + mˆqa(Oˆq(k); tˆq(k), tˆq(k + 1)) + mˆqa(Oˆq(l); tˆq(k + 1), tˆq(l))
≤ xˆqa(k) + mˆqa(Oˆq(k); t∞(v − 1)− L4(v−1), t∞(v) + L4v−2)
+mˆqa(Oˆ
q(l); t∞(v)− L4v−2, t∞(v) + L4v−2)
< x∞a (v − 1) + L4(v−1)+m∞a (Oˆq(k))(t∞(v)− t∞(v − 1) + 2L4v−2)
+m∞a (Oˆ
q(l))× 3L4v−2+ 2
< x∞a (v − 1) + (m∞a (O∞(v − 1))) (t∞(v)− t∞(v − 1)) + L4v
= x∞a (v) + L
4v,
where the first equality follows from (3.4), the first inequality follows frommqa(Oˆ
q(l); t, t′) ≥
mqa(Oˆ
q(j); t, t′) for all l ≥ j, the second inequality follows from the inductive assumption
and Claims 5 and 6, the third inequality follows from the inductive assumption, (B3) and
Eq3(v, pi) and E
q
5(v, pi), the fourth inequality follows from Oˆ
q(k) = O∞(v − 1) and (B1),








q(j − 1); tˆq(j − 1), tˆq(j))
≥ xˆqa(k) + mˆqa(Oˆq(k); tˆq(k), tˆq(l))
≥ xˆqa(k) + mˆqa(Oˆq(k); t∞(v − 1) + L4(v−1), t∞(v)− L4v−2)
≥ x∞a (v − 1)− L4(v−1)+m∞a (O∞(v − 1))[t∞(v)− t∞(v − 1)− 2L4v−2]
> x∞a (v)− L4v,
where the first inequality follows from Oˆq(j − 1) ⊆ Oˆq(k) for any j ≥ k + 1, the second
inequality follows from the inductive assumption and Claim 5, the third inequality follows
from the inductive assumption and Eq6(v, pi), and the last inequality follows from (3.12)
and (B1). These inequalities complete the proof. ‖
We have thus completed the recursive argument, which taken together proves that
Tˆ qa ∈ (t∞(v) − L4v, t∞(v) + L4v) if and only if t∞a (v) = t∞(v), for any q > Q for some
Q ∈ N. 
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Proof of Theorem 2. We shall show that for any ε > 0 there exists Q such that, for any
q > Q, for any pi0 ∈ Π and a ∈ O,
|PS∞a (pi0)−RP qa (pi0)| < (2L4(n+1) + 6n(n+ 1)(n+ 1)!)ε.(B10)
Since n is a finite constant, relation (B10) implies the Theorem.
To show this first assume, without loss of generality, that  satisfies (B2) and Q is so
large that (B3) holds for any q > Q. We have
RP qa (pi0) = E
[
Tˆ qa − τˆ qa (pi0)
]
= E









































































































where for any event E, E¯ is the complement event of E.
First we bound the first term of expression (B11). Since v¯∞ ≤ n+ 1, Lemma 1 implies
that
E







 ∈ [T∞a − τ∞a (pi0)− 2L4(n+1), T∞a − τ∞a (pi0) + 2L4(n+1)].
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Second, we bound the second term of expression (B11). By the weak law of large num-




<  for any i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6},
q > Q, v ∈ {1, . . . , v¯∞} and pi ∈ Π with m∞pi > 0. Since there are at most 6(n+ 1)(n+ 1)!
such events and, in general, the sum of probabilities of a number of events is weakly larger



















≤ 6(n+ 1)(n+ 1)!.
Since Tˆ qa − τˆ qa (pi0) ∈ [0, 1] for any a, q and pi0, the second term of equation (B11) is in
[−6(n+ 1)(n+ 1)!, 6(n+ 1)(n+ 1)!].
From the above arguments, we have that
|PS∞a (pi0)−RP qa (pi0)| < (2L4(n+1) + 6(n+ 1)(n+ 1)!),
completing the proof. 
C. Proof of Proposition 3
The proposition uses the following two lemmas. Let {Γq} be a family of replica
economies. Given any q, define a correspondence γ : N1  N q such that |γ(i)| = q
for each i ∈ N1, γ(i) ∩ γ(j) = ∅ if i 6= j, and all agents in γ(i) have the same preference
as i. Call γ(i) i’s clones in the q-fold replica.
Lemma 2. For all q ∈ N and a, b ∈ O˜, aB (RP 1,m1) b ⇐⇒ aB (RP q,mq) b.
Proof. We proceed in two steps.
(i) aB (RP 1,m1) b =⇒ aB (RP q,mq) b: Suppose first aB (RP 1,m1) b. There exists an
individual i∗ ∈ N1 and an ordering (i1(1), . . . , i1(|N1|)) (implied by some draw f 1 ∈ [0, 1]|N
1|)
such that the agents in front of i∗ in that ordering consume all the objects that i∗ prefers
to b but not b, and i∗ consumes b.
Now consider the q-fold replica. With positive probability, we have an ordering (γ¯(i1(1)), . . . , γ¯(i
1
(|N1|))),
where γ¯(i) is an arbitrary permutation of γ(i). Under this ordering, each agent in γ(i1(j))
will consume a copy of the object agent i1(j) in the base economy will consume, and
all the agents in γ(i∗) will consume b (despite preferring a over b). This proves that
aB (RP q,mq) b.
(ii) aB (RP q,mq) b =⇒ aB (RP 1,m1) b: Suppose aB (RP q,mq) b. Then, with positive
probability, a draw f q ∈ [0, 1]|Nq | entails an ordering in which the agents ahead of i∗ ∈ N q
consume all of the objects that i∗ prefers to b, but not all the copies of b have been
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consumed by them. List these objects in the order that their last copies are consumed,
and let the set of these objects be Oˆ := {o1, ...., om} ⊂ O, where ol is completely consumed
before ol+1 for all l = 1, . . . ,m− 1. (Note that a ∈ Oˆ.) Let i∗∗ be such that i∗ ∈ γ(i∗∗).
We first construct a correspondence ξ : Oˆ 7→ N1 \ {i∗∗} defined by
ξ(o) :=
{
i ∈ N1 \ {i∗∗} | ∃j ∈ γ(i) who consumes o under f q} .
Claim 9. Any agent in N q who consumes ol prefers ol to all objects in O˜ \ {o1, ..., ol−1}
under f q. Hence, any agent in ξ(ol) prefers ol to all objects in O˜ \ {o1, ..., ol−1}.
Claim 10. For each O′ ⊂ Oˆ, | ∪o∈O′ ξ(o)| ≥ |O′|.
Proof. Suppose otherwise. Then, there exists O′ ⊂ Oˆ such that k := | ∪o∈O′ ξ(o)| <
|O′| =: l. Reindex the sets so that ∪o∈O′ξ(o) = {a1, ...., ak} and O′ = {o1, ..., ol}. Let
xij denote the number of clones of agent a










At the same time, all q copies of each object in O′ are consumed, and at most q − 1





xij ≥ lq − (q − 1) = (l − 1)q + 1 > kq,
We thus have a contradiction. ‖
By Hall’s Theorem, Claim 10 implies that there exists a mapping µ : Oˆ 7→ N1 \ {i∗∗}
such that µ(o) ∈ ξ(o) for each o ∈ Oˆ and µ(o) 6= µ(o′) for o 6= o′.
Now consider the base economy. With positive probability, f 1 has a priority ordering,
(µ(o1), ..., µ(om), i
∗∗) followed by an arbitrary permutation of the remaining agents. Given
such a priority ordering, the objects in Oˆ will be all consumed before i∗∗ gets her turn
but b will not be consumed before i∗∗ gets her turn, so she will consume b. This proves
that aB (RP 1,m1) b. 
Lemma 3. RP 1 is wasteful if and only if RP q is wasteful for any q ∈ N.
Proof. We proceed in two steps.
(i) the “only if” Part: Suppose that RP 1 is wasteful. Then, there are objects
a, b ∈ O˜ and an agent i∗ ∈ N1 who prefers a over b such that she consumes b under some
ordering (˜i1(1), . . . , i˜
1
(|N1|)) (implied by some f˜
1) and that a is not consumed by any agent
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under (ˆi1(1), . . . , iˆ
1
(|N1|)) (implied by some fˆ
1). (This is the necessary implication of the
“wastefulness” under RP 1.)
Now consider its q-fold replica, RP q. With positive probability, an ordering (γ¯(˜i1(1)), . . . , γ¯(˜i
1
(|N1|)))
arises, where γ¯(i) is an arbitrary permutation of γ(i). Clearly, each agent in γ(i∗) must
consume b even though she prefers a over b (since all copies of all objects the agents in
γ(i∗) prefers to b are all consumed by the agents ahead of them). Likewise, with posi-
tive probability, an ordering (γ¯(ˆi1(1)), . . . , γ¯(ˆi
1
(|N1|))) arises. Clearly, under this ordering, no
copies of object a are consumed. It follows that RP q is wasteful.
(ii) the “if” Part: Suppose next that RP q is wasteful. Then, there are objects
a, b ∈ O˜ and an agent i∗∗ ∈ N q who prefers a over b such that she consumes b under
some ordering (˜iq(1), . . . , i˜
q
(|Nq |)) (implied by some f˜
q) and that not all copies of object a
are consumed by any agent under (ˆiq(1), . . . , iˆ
q
(|Nq |)) (implied by some fˆ
q).
Now consider the corresponding base economy and associated RP 1. The argument of
Part (ii) of Lemma 2 implies that there exists an ordering (˜i1(1), . . . , i˜
1
(|N1|)) under which
agent i˜∗ = γ−1(i∗∗) ∈ N1 consumes b even though she prefers a over b.
Next, we prove that RP 1 admits a positive-probability ordering under which object a
is not consumed. Let N ′′ := {r ∈ N1|∃j ∈ γ(r) who consumes the null object under fˆ q}.
For each r ∈ N ′′, we let ør denote the null object some clone of r ∈ N1 consume. In other
words, we use different notations for the null object consumed by the clones of different
agents in N ′′. Given this convention, there can be at most q copies of each ør.
Let O¯ := O ∪ (∪r∈N ′′ør) \ {a}, and define a correspondence ψ : N1 → O¯ by
ψ(r) := {b ∈ O¯|∃j ∈ γ(r) who consumes b under fˆ q}.
Claim 11. For each N ′ ⊂ N1, | ∪r∈N ′ ψ(r)| ≥ |N ′|.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, k := | ∪r∈N ′ ψ(r)| < |N ′| =: l. Reindex the sets so that
∪r∈N ′ψ(r) =: {o1, ...., ok} and N ′ = {r1, ..., rl}. Let xij denote the number of copies of
object oj ∈ ψ(ri) consumed by the clones of ri in the q-fold replica under fˆ q.






At the same time, all q clones of each agent in N ′, excluding q− 1 agents (who may be





xij ≥ lq + q − 1 = (l − 1)q + 1 > kq,
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We thus have a contradiction. ‖
Claim 11 then implies, via Hall’s theorem, that there exists a mapping ν : N1 → O¯
such that ν(r) ∈ ψ(r) for each r ∈ N1 and ν(r) 6= ν(r′) if r 6= r′.
Let O′ ⊂ O¯ be the subset of all object types in O¯ whose entire q copies are consumed
under fˆ q. Order O′ in the order that the last copy of each object is consumed; i.e., label
O′ = {o1, ..., om} such that the last copy of object oi is consumed prior to the last copy
of oj if i < j. Let Nˆ be any permutation of the agents in ν−1(O¯ \ O′). Now consider
the ordering in RP 1: (ˆi1(1), . . . , iˆ
1
(|N1|)) = (ν
−1(o1), . . . , ν−1(om), Nˆ), where the notational
convention is as follows: for any l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if ν−1(ol) is empty, then no agent is
ordered.
Claim 12. Under the ordering (ˆi1(1), . . . , iˆ
1
(|N1|)) = (ν
−1(o1), . . . , ν−1(om), Nˆ), a is not
consumed.
Proof. For any l = 0, . . . ,m, let Ol be the set of objects that are consumed by agents
ν−1(o1), . . . , ν−1(ol) under the current ordering (note that some of ν−1(o1), . . . , ν−1(ol)
may be nonexistent). We shall show Ol ⊆ {o1, . . . , ol} by an inductive argument. First
note that the claim is obvious for l = 0. Assume that the claim holds for 0, 1, . . . , l− 1. If
ν−1(ol) = ∅, then no agent exists to consume an object at this step and hence the claim is
obvious. Suppose ν−1(ol) 6= ∅. By definition of ν, agent ν−1(ol) weakly prefers ol to any
object in O˜\{o1, . . . , ol−1}. Therefore ν−1(ol) consumes an object in {ol}∪({o1, . . . , ol−1}\
Ol−1) ⊆ {o1, . . . , ol}. This and the inductive assumption imply Ol ⊆ {o1, . . . , ol}.
Next, consider agents that appears in the ordered set Nˆ . By an argument similar to the
previous paragraph, each agent i in Nˆ consumes an object in ν(i) ∪ ({o1, . . . , om} \Om).
In particular, no agent in Nˆ consumes a. ‖
Since the ordering (ˆi1(1), . . . , iˆ
1
(|N1|)) = (ν
−1(o1), . . . , ν−1(om), Nˆ) realizes with positive
probability under RP 1, Claim 12 completes the proof of Lemma 3. 
Proof of Proposition 3. If RP q is ordinally inefficient for some q ∈ N, then either it is
wasteful or there must be a cycle of binary relation B(RP q,mq). Lemmas 2 and 3 then
imply that RP 1 is wasteful or there exists a cycle of B(RP 1,m1), and that RP q′ is wasteful
or there exists a cycle of B(RP q′ ,mq′) for each q′ ∈ N. Hence, for each q′ ∈ N, RP q′ is
ordinally inefficient. 
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